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THE STORY OF AHMED al-JABARI 
Ahmed al-Jabari was known to keep out of the spotlight. The “General,” as his 
fellow soldiers called him, had a notorious past (Beaumont 2012). In 1982, Israeli 
authorities arrested him for armed smuggling, leading to a 13-year imprisonment 
(Beaumont 2012). Frustrated with the corruption and ineffectiveness of his organization, 
Fatah, he joined its rival Hamas upon release (Beaumont 2012). As a member, al-Jabari 
worked up the ranks, leading dozens of terrorist attacks that killed hundreds of Israeli 
civilians (Ravid 2012; Meo 2012). In 2006, he captured Israeli soldier Gilat Shalit and 
made international headlines when he escorted the prisoner five years later (Meo 2012). 
For one man, Israeli authorities released 1,000 Palestinians- 300 of them convicted killers 
(Meo 2012). But, that is not all. One year later, al-Jabari led Hamas to ruthless victory 
over his former organization to secure the Gaza Strip (Kershner and Akram 2012). 
All the while, the Israeli Defense Forces tried in vain for over a decade to 
eliminate al-Jabari. They carried out four assassination attempts throughout the 2000s 
(Meo 2013). Yet, al-Jabari was able to survive each one due to his cunningness. He 
seldom made public appearances; few Palestinians in the Gaza Strip had ever seen him 
(Meo 2012). He also supposedly never carried a cell phone for fear of the Israeli Defense 
Forces tracing his position, and relocated nightly from house to house, never staying in 
the same place (Beaumont 2012). 
But, on November 14th, 2012, al-Jabari’s attempts to avoid detection were 
fruitless. High above the sky, an aircraft followed al-Jabari all day, without its pilot 
flinching, blinking, or feeling weary. In fact, the pilot did not breath. It was a drone. 
Probably, an IAI Eitan, capable of long endurance operations of more than 50 
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consecutive hours and able to fly upwards of 35,000 feet (Wright 2012). This particular 
drone could fire missiles. As al-Jabari drove his car down a calm street, the drone 
unleashed one. In a matter of seconds, the car was obliterated. The speed of the missile 
was so fast that one journalist remarked, “Jabari probably didn’t even hear the missile 
that killed him” (Meo 2012). There were no casualties (Meo 2012). Israeli Defense 
Forces posted on their Facebook page a picture of al-Jabari overwritten by the word 
“eliminated,” and a video on YouTube of the assassination (Kershner and Akram 2012; 
Borger 2012). The message had already been created prior to al-Jabari’s death, the video 
posted minutes afterwards.  
The main event happened after al-Jabari’s assassination. Israeli Defense Forces let 
fly a combination of manned and unmanned aircraft over Gaza that conducted 20 missile 
attacks that day (Al Jazeera 2012). The amount of aircraft flying later that week were so 
plentiful that one reporter, Richard Engel, posted on Twitter: “So many drones over 
#Gaza city it sounds like everyone is out mowing their lawns in the dark” (Engel 2012). 
Other reports (Pearlman 2012) confirmed that the buzz of drones was nearly deafening.1 
Overall, drone strikes accounted for 36 deaths, while injuring more than 100 people 
(Wright 2012). According to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (2012), the drone 
strikes were more efficient than manned ones. Although they accounted for five percent 
of all the strikes over Gaza, they caused 23% of the deaths. Most strikingly of all, drones 
killed more Palestinians in eight days than Palestinian rockets killed Israelis in the last 
eight years combined (Wright 2012). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The buzz was so loud it led to Palestinians calling these drones “Zenana,” an onomatopoeia that sounds 
like the aircraft’s distinctive buzz. But, probably, the more legitimate reason for the name is due to its 
translation. It is Arabic slang for ‘nagging wife’. 
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THE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS RAISED 
Drones provided crucial advantages for the Israeli Defense Forces in the Gaza 
War. They were able to gather information of targets on the ground and strike those 
targets with pinpoint precision. Later, they unleashed widespread destruction over Gaza. 
Without a doubt, such capabilities raise important concerns in the realm of international 
relations. Do other countries besides Israel possess these technologies? If so, which 
theories of international relations explain the diffusion? 
Everett Rogers (2003, 5) provides the seminal work on diffusion, defining it as 
the, “process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over 
time among members of a social system.” Although Rogers described diffusion as it 
applied to consumer technology products, his definition aptly applies to military 
innovations (Horowitz 2012). In effect, the thesis is concerned with the diffusion of 
drones, a purely military innovation. It is important to note that diffusion explicitly refers 
to the number of states that acquire drones. 
Three international relations theories posit specific ways in which diffusion may 
occur. The three theories are: offense-defense realism (hereafter known as offense-
defense), power transition , and organization diffusion (hereafter known as organization). 
Specifically, adoption-capacity theory will represent organization theory, since the latter 
is an umbrella term for many theories. Data is compiled to demonstrate the diffusion of 
drones since the early 1960s. Then, each theory is assessed though statistical tests. In 
short, a case can be made for all three theories. However, the tests are limited, and the 
theories suffer from notable flaws. Future research should address both qualms.  
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The thesis is divided into four main sections. The introduction affords a brief 
overview of drone development, with a special emphasis on the United States, a key first 
adopter.2 The discussion will serve as a basis for the rest of the thesis. The second section 
describes the major international relations theories and how they relate specifically to the 
process of diffusion. Each theory hypothesizes how diffusion takes place. The third 
section compiles the data concerning the diffusion of drones. It shows the rate of the 
diffusion of the technology from the years 1960 to 2011. The last section presents the 
verdict assessing each theory. In order to do this, each theory is compared to the data and 
statistical tests are undertaken.  
INTRODUCTION 
Drones have many names, including robot planes, pilotless aircraft, remotely 
piloted aircraft, remotely piloted vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The 
Department of Defense (2013) defines a drone as, “a powered, aerial vehicle that does not 
carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly itself 
(autonomously) or be remotely piloted, can be expendable or recoverable at the end of 
the flight, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload.” Often times, the main difference 
between a drone and a guided missile is this ability to be recoverable at the end of the 
flight. A pilot using a controller operates the drone from a ground control station, and 
together the drone and control station are deemed unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).3  
Although drones are increasingly receiving a lot of media attention, they are not a 
new military innovation. The United States military has researched and developed drones 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This will be discussed in more detail.  
3 Peter Singer (2009, 33) notes that the pilots can be located as far as 7, 500 miles away (often times in 
Nevada) from the drones they are flying. They control drones through the use of satellite communications.   
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since at least the middle of the 20th century.4 Jeremiah Gertler (2012), a specialist in 
military aviation technologies, finds archival evidence that drones were tested in World 
War I, although not used in the war.5 The story of significant drone development begins 
in the early 1960s (Ehrhard 2012). According to recently declassified reports analyzed by 
Thomas Ehrhard (2010, 5), three United States intelligence agencies worked together to 
fund more than 40% of the total drone investment from the 1960 to the early 2000s. The 
three agencies were the Central Intelligence Agency, the Air Force and their combined 
interaction agency: the National Reconnaissance Office, whose existence was so secret its 
name was declassified only after the Cold War. 
In many ways, the Cold War served as a constant impetus to drone development. 
The intelligence community largely invested in drone development for fears of manned 
pilots falling into Soviet hands and disclosing sensitive secrets (Ehrhard 2010, 6). In the 
late 1950s, Air Staff reconnaissance officer Col. Hal Wood voiced such fears, and three 
popular incidents confirmed them (2010, 6). Each led to the development of increasingly 
superior drones. The first instance occurred on May 1, 1960, when the Soviets shot down 
Francis Gary Powers’ U2 high above the Soviet Union. His eventual captivity alarmed 
those in the intelligence community, leading to a defense contract for the Red Wagon, 
one of the first drones produced in the United States (Ehrhard 2010, 6).6 There was more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Thomas Ehrhard (2010) for perhaps the most complete historical accounting of the development of 
drones in the United States. 
5 For an interesting story about how drones were tested, review Operation Aphrodite, a secret drone 
operation that led to the death of Joseph P. Kennedy, the older brother of John F. Kennedy. Joseph died in a 
bomber that was being remotely controlled by a nearby plane (Olson 2004). The bomber-drone prematurely 
detonated. His death led to the drone program’s hiatus in World War II, and the loss of a young man slated 
to take the political reins of his father.  
6 Indeed, the 1960 incident had deep implications for the drone program, even years later. In 1966, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance emphasized drone development, of one the most advanced early drones 
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funding from the National Reconnaissance Office for the drone program following the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. In one of the most dangerous times during the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union shot down and killed Major Ralph Anderson. But, this time, something interesting 
happened: one day after, Fire Fly drones, one of the most significant operational drones, 
were deployed to Florida to continue Major Anderson’s original reconnaissance mission 
(Ehrhard 2010, 8). Ironically, however, they would return because the intelligence 
community, “did not want to tip the Soviet Union to the presence of this super-
capability” (2010, 8). In a twist, the same reasons the United States did not wish to fly 
manned aircraft, for fear of revealing to much sensitive information, would deter the use 
of Fire Fly drones- the very embodiment of ‘sensitive information’. A third popular event 
exists. On April 18, 1968, North Korea shot down an EC-121 Super Constellation Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft that was flying over international but volatile airspace at 
the time, killing 31 crewmen. The incident caused the National Reconnaissance Office to 
contract with a private defense company, the Ryan Aeronautical Company, to build four 
Firebee drones to replace the SIGINT (2010, 12). This time, these drones replaced the 
SIGINT’s duties, and eventually led the way to what Ehrhard (2010, 28) calls the most 
significant drone ever produced: the Lightning Bug, which was later used in hundreds of 
missions in the Vietnam War. Over 1,000 were produced and hundreds lost during the 
campaign (2010, 28). 
Although it seems that each incident fueled drone development, the overall 
growth of the drone program was slow for a number of reasons. In perspective, the 
development of drones in the second half of the twentieth century was constantly plagued 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
produced, the D-21B. The reason, he noted, was to, “never again allow a Francis Gary Powers situation to 
develop…All our flights over denied territory will either be satellites or drones” (Rich 1994, 267). 
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and their true role in war limited. The most important reason, Ehrhard observes (2010, 4), 
is that “drones never developed a tiered operational constituency- that is, one that 
spanned the operational structure from the flight line to the chief of staff.” In other words, 
the heads of the National Reconnaissance Office each had different reservations 
concerning the importance of drones, leading to fluctuations in funding. Another main 
reason was that drones were expensive to produce (Ehrhard 2010, 57). There was no 
cheap and reliable method to produce drones, making drones like the Red Wagon or 
Lightning Bug costly (Ehrhard 2010, 45). In fact, the Lightning Bug project cost the Air 
Force and CIA a combined 5.8 billion dollars (in today’s dollar), the most expensive 
drone program before the new millennium (2010, 24). Furthermore, the technology was 
immature. Drones failed to offer advantages over other conventional alternatives like 
satellites and manned aviation that could perform the same reconnaissance missions 
(Ehrhard 2010, 4). These two technologies were preferred time and again and received 
the most funding from the intelligence community (2010, 4). The same competition exists 
today, although it is dwindling. Besides the lack of support, high cost of production and 
lack of technology, other formidable obstacles loomed. Ehrhard (2010, 39 and 56) claims 
that international air traffic controls limited the airspace in which drones could fly and 
that arms control regimes, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or 
1988 Intermediate Nuclear Forces arms control agreement, halted their construction.  
The majority of these obstacles are dwindling today. Peter Singer (2009, 100) 
explains how advances in drone technology have accelerated as a direct result of the new 
information age- which he likes to describe as an ongoing revolution. He (2009, 101) 
observes that, “major shifts are already going on in computing power and machine 
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intelligence,” to the point that drones are increasingly being used by the United States 
military. In fact, as will be shown, they are starting to replace manned aircraft in various 
roles, especially information gathering (DOD 2012; Gertler 2012). As a result of 
advanced navigation and communications technologies, drones are more reliable to 
control and can fly autonomously. Gertler (2012, 1-2) describes two other cardinal 
reasons for the increase in the use of drones: satellite bandwidth and the nature of present 
wars. Satellite bandwidth allows drone pilots from more than a thousand miles away to 
control drones. Meanwhile, drones are advantageous in asymmetrical warfare. Insurgents 
in Afghanistan and Iraq exemplify the use of this type of warfare. Stephen Biddle (2004) 
cites that the modern system of force employment caused asymmetrical warfare. 
Asymmetrical warfare is a response by insurgents to the great power of weapons on the 
battlefield. They hide behind trees, up on mountains, or behind any other natural and 
man-made barrier for protection (Biddle 2004). But, as Gertler (2012, 2) observes, drones 
can often times locate these insurgents in any locale from high above.7 A single drone 
cannot be heard or seen at high altitudes. The result is that insurgents, like al-Jabari, stand 
little chance of avoiding detection. As one United States Navy researcher tells Singer, 
“To me, the robot [or drone] is our answer to the suicide bomber” (2009, 62).  
There are a number of reasons drones are advantageous in warfare besides their 
ability to detect the enemy from high above noiselessly and unseen. First and foremost, 
the key advantage of drones lies in their ability to save the lives of the pilots and troops 
they replace. Without a risk to life, they can conduct missions in areas that are too 
dangerous for manned aircraft to access. Thomas Ehrhard (2010, 28) notes numerous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In a way, drones help lift the ‘fog of war’ originally discussed by Carl von Clausewitz. See Michael 
Howard’s Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction (2002) for a summary.  
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examples in the Vietnam War in which a particular drone, the Buffalo Hunter, operated in 
conditions impossible for manned aircraft.8 Using drones also ensures that sensitive 
information will not be leaked should the aircraft be shot down and the pilot captured. 
Another key advantage of drones is that they can conduct a variety of missions. The 
Department of Defense (2009) describes their numerous capabilities: “In today’s military, 
unmanned systems are highly desirable…for their versatility and persistence. By 
performing tasks such as surveillance; signals intelligence; precision target designation; 
mine detection; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear reconnaissance, unmanned 
systems have made key contributions.”  
Moreover, drones are comparatively cheaper than manned aircraft. Singer (2009, 
33) estimates that for the price of one new F-22 jet fighter, the Air Force could purchase 
85 Predator drones that have the ability to conduct strikes, albeit weaker ones than the jet. 
Lastly, as the al-Jabari incident highlights, drones are not prone to any ‘human baggage’. 
Singer (2009,63) explains in more detail: “They don’t show up at work red eyed…they 
don’t think about their sweethearts at home…they don’t get jealous when a fellow soldier 
gets a promotion…they don’t participate in inside jobs.” Undeterred by human emotion 
or weariness in warfare, they can outlast any human pilot or insurgent on the ground if 
recently deployed for combat.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In one operation in the Vietnam War, codenamed United Effort, Lightning Bug drones were sent on 
suicide missions. Surface-to-air missiles destroyed them as they purposefully continued to gain intelligence 
(Ehrhard 2010, 25). 
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THE THREE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES OF DIFFUSION 
Clearly, drones offer many advantages in warfare. But, do other states possess 
them? The answer, in short, is yes. Three theories are analyzed to explain their diffusion. 
The three are offense-defense, power transition  and organization theory. Offense-defense 
and power transition  are not necessarily concerned with the diffusion of military 
innovations, but each does touch upon the subject enough to posit rudimentary 
hypotheses about how drones may diffuse. Each theory provides an estimate concerning 
the rate and scope of diffusion. The rate refers to the speed of diffusion, and is classified 
as either fast or slow. The scope refers to the systemic character of the diffusion. It may 
be even (or uniform), in which states have an equal chance to adopt the innovation, or 
uneven (not uniform), in which only certain states will adopt it.9 A complete review of 
each theory is later provided in Table 1. 
Offense-defense theory is the first to be assessed. The theory is grounded in the 
notion of neorealism. Kenneth Waltz (1979) first provided clues as to how the theory 
relates to the diffusion of military innovations. His assumption that anarchy dominates 
the system eventually explains how diffusion occurs. According to Waltz, states living in 
anarchy have no guarantee of their existence. States seek one major goal- security- and 
are self-helpers. As a result of states seeking security, competition erupts. Competition 
becomes synonymous the possibility of conflict. Waltz (1979, 127) explains, “The 
possibility that conflict will be conducted by force leads to competition in the arts and 
instrument of force.” Waltz cautions that when a state becomes too strong, the lesser 
states feel threatened (1979, 126). They will try and balance against the state, either 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 What exactly fast/slow and even/uneven mean is uncertain. No theory provides an explicit definition for 
the terms. Future work should address the issue.  
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internally or externally. Internal balancing refers to states building up their own forces to 
curb the threat.  External balancing refers to states forming alliances in order to achieve 
the same result.  
Waltz’s notion of internal balancing refers to the process of diffusion. When 
states internally balance, they look unto the greater states for cues as to which military 
weapons and doctrines or strategies in war they should adopt. Thus, the structure of the 
international arena can play a fateful role dictating states’ behavior involving emulation, 
if internal balancing occurs. Joao Resende-Santos (1996) explains the underlying 
mechanism. When a technology or strategy’s advantages become apparent to other states, 
a demonstration effect occurs. The demonstration effect is defined as a process signaling 
to states the importance of a military innovation or strategy. According to Resende-
Santos (1996, 200, 211), war often serves to provide a demonstration effect. He explains 
(1996, 211), “In the military sphere, it is the victorious military system of every great war 
that sets the standard by which all others measure themselves and which acts as the 
model imitated by all.” War is the proving ground. 
However, Waltz’s basic notion of neorealism is too limited to predict the possible 
diffusion of drones. He does not provide an exact rate of a state’s adoption of the 
innovation.10 His theory merely predicts that states that feel threatened should adopt an 
innovation. Goldman and Andres (1999) rightfully assume from the theory that 
threatened states should automatically adopt an innovation when they choose to respond 
by internal balancing. But, states could also externally balance against a power and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Resende-Santos (1996, 1950) critiques the theory for the same reason, “After putting forth a theory of 
emulation, Waltz leaves it largely unexplored. He does not discuss why and how emulation vary in pace 
and scope.” 
  
	  12 
choose to not adopt the innovation. This leads to variance in any prediction of diffusion 
using neorealism.  
Due to the fact that neorealism is undeveloped, Resende-Santos (1996; 2007) 
posits a more updated theory of neorealism to better explain diffusion. He suggests 
offense-defense theory in order to better predict the rate and scope of the diffusion of 
military innovations. Resende-Santos’s goal is to provide a more full developed 
underlying mechanism in which neorealism can predict diffusion (1996, 197).11 He uses 
Waltz’s ideas concerning the process of internal balancing as a springboard to put forth 
his theory (1996, 204). In his theory, states remain self-helpers in an anarchic realm. The 
demonstration effect also remains pivotal in showcasing other states which military 
innovations are useful. But, the one major difference, according to Resende-Santos 
(1996, 215), is the mechanism he posits: “The primary factor determining the pace and 
scope of military emulation is the offensive-defensive balance.” Essentially, the type of 
balance a state is in, whether offensive or defensive, determines its chances to adopt an 
innovation.  
Offense-defense theory thus adds specificity to Waltz’s neorealism theory. 
Resende-Santos (1996, 217-218) argues that the nature of the existing balance of power 
in the system affects the rate of diffusion.12 The balance can be offensive or defensive. 
An offensive balance is one in which all states are disadvantaged defensively. Resende-
Santos (1996, 218) explains, “When the state finds it difficult to defend its national 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In fact, unlike Waltz, Resende-Santos (1996; 2007) is explicitly concerned with diffusion of military 
innovations.  
12 In a way, this is not different than what Waltz contends. Both Waltz and Resende-Santos credit the 
system for influencing whether a state adopts an innovation. The difference is that Resende-Santos 
identifies the importance of balances, and thereby he adds specificity to neorealism. 
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territory because of geographic liabilities and the nature of the existing military 
technology, it is at a defensive disadvantage.” This means that the state’s security is not 
ensured in the balance. Its technology is insufficient for the purpose of protecting it 
borders. A state’s vulnerability induces emulation of new military technology, “…when 
offense is easy for potential attackers, even minor shifts in the regional balance and 
strategic environment will heighten the insecurity of the disadvantaged state; such shifts 
of threats will trigger immediate and substantial [internal] balancing efforts on its part” 
(Resende-Santos 1996, 218). States in an offensive balance will try to adopt the latest 
military innovations in order to better protect their borders.13 Thus, the scope and rate of 
diffusion should be even and rapid among states in the offensive balance. 
 A defensive balance means that the states involved do not face a security threat 
(Resende-Santos 1996; 2007). They are defensively advantaged; the technology they 
possess can safeguard their borders from potential attackers (at least, that is what state 
leaders believe). Their defenses can handle the offensive prowess of any other state in the 
balance. As Jack Levy (1984) notes, Carl von Clausewitz was one of the first military 
thinkers to hypothesize the notion of defensive balances when he suggested that the 
superiority defenses in war leaves both sides without an incentive to attack. Robert Jervis 
(1978, 188-190) concurs. When there is a defensive balance, in theory, states should feel 
less need to adopt any type of military innovation. The theory is concerned with states 
wanting security. If there is a defensive balance, there are no perceived threats to leaders. 
Resende-Santos (1996, 218) further developed the notion, “Defensive dominance allows 
states to react more slowly and with greater restraint to the capabilities-enhancing efforts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 States will try to adopt the innovation largely provided that a demonstration effect has taken place. Such 
an effect often times determines which innovations states find useful to adopt (Resende-Santos 1996, 211).  
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and gains of neighbors. Defensive dominance means offensive disadvantages for 
prospective attackers.” Thus, the rate and scope of diffusion in such balances will be 
uneven and slow. However, the type of balance present is not always indicative of 
whether a country will or will not adopt an innovation. Sometimes, the nature of the 
weapon itself matters to whether states adopt it. 
In offense-defense balance, the nature of the innovation or practice that is diffused 
also matters in certain instances. In offensive balances, George Quester (1977) explains, 
the characteristic of the innovation can determine which state adopts it. On the one hand, 
if the innovation is offensive in nature, stronger states will adopt it. On the other hand, if 
the innovation is defensive, weaker states will adopt it. They will have the desire to adopt 
the innovation for security purposes. Acquiring the offensive innovation may not afford 
any advantages to the weaker state- it probably cannot compete with the stronger state in 
an arms race of the technology. Thus, sometimes the scope and rate of diffusion in 
offensive balances is not even and rapid due to the nature of the innovation being 
diffused. Diffusion may vary.  
In the case of drones, then, it matters whether they are defensive or offensive in 
nature. If they are defensive, offense-defense theory suggests that states in an offensive 
balance will likely adopt them to improve security. A case can be made that drones are 
defensive. The United States Government Accountability Office (2012, 11) concludes 
from their review of the drones that have proliferated that, “According to available 
analysis, the majority of foreign UAVs that countries have acquired fall within the 
tactical category. Tactical UAVs primarily conduct intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance missions and typically have a limited operational range of 300 
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kilometers.” It seems that the missions drones perform are defensive. They can fly only a 
limited distance from their ground control stations, and can only gather intelligence. They 
cannot conduct armed strikes. In some instances, like in the United States, such drones 
patrol the border for surveillance (Constantini 2012). Thus, an argument can be made that 
the majority of drones are defensive.  
But, a caveat to this exception in offensive balances is that, sometimes, the 
characteristic does not matter. Stephen Van Evera (1984), another offense-defense 
theorist, notes that offensive technologies can sometimes diffuse among weaker states in 
an offensive balance due to a perceived offensive bias. These threatened states might 
prefer innovations that are offensive simply because they are offensive, and so the rate 
and scope of diffusion for offensive technologies might not change whatsoever. In the 
same scenario, defensive innovations do not enjoy such partiality- the threatened states 
largely adopt them, not the offensive (Resende-Santos 1996, 220).  
Hypothesis 1: Under offense-defense theory, the nature of the balance can 
determine the adoption of military innovations. In an offensive balance, states are 
threatened and are more likely to adopt drones, especially because drones are defensive. 
States in a defensive balance are less likely or have fewer incentives to adopt drones 
because their security is not necessarily at stake.  
 
There are a myriad of problems with offense-defense theory. Jack Levy (1984) 
critiques the hypothesis because it is based on the notion that state leaders perceive the 
correct type of balance. Sprout and Sprout (1965) echo the concern: too commonly, a 
leader perceives a ‘psychological’ environment quite different than the objective 
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operational environment. Secondly, as Levy (1984, 222) and Resende-Santos (1996, 215) 
observe, there is no explicit definition for an offensive or defensive balance. They do 
point to the fact that historians seem to have little difficulty categorizing some balance. 
For example, it is easy to classify trench warfare in World War I as defensive, with many 
of the weapons and strategies available favoring the defense (Levy 1984). Moreover, 
Quester (1977) states it is clear that historical empires were typically in offensive 
balances, due to their nature of trying to expand their borders. Still, Levy (1984, 235), is 
disillusioned with the ambiguity, concluding “…the concept of offense/defense balance is 
too vague and encompassing to be useful in theoretical analysis.” One other reason upsets 
Levy. Since offense-defense theory is a neorealist theory, it is perhaps too concerned with 
the external structure of the international arena dictating state behavior. Perhaps, there 
could be other reasons affecting adoption like a state’s domestic politics. 
The second international relations theory presupposing how diffusions occur is 
power transition theory. It is important to note that power transition theory is not 
primarily concerned with diffusion. Instead, the theory is concerned with what its name 
implies: power transitions (Organski 1958; Tammen et al. 2000). War is most likely 
when a hegemon’s power is challenged by a weaker, but increasingly powerful, state. The 
challenger is dissatisfied with the status quo established by the hegemon (Organski 1958; 
Tammen et al. 2000).  
Robert Gilpin (1981) further developed the theory and argued how it relates to the 
process of diffusion. Essentially, power transitions are synonymous with the diffusion of 
military technologies. The reason is not because both states are getting ready for war, per 
se. Rather, power transitions signify that the challenger state is experiencing national 
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growth. This growth largely determines whether the state adopts the innovation 
(Goldman and Andres 1999). Goldman and Andres (1999, 86) explain, “Military best 
practices will diffuse differently among states, and the rate and scope of diffusion 
depends on levels of national development, which determine the capacity of states to 
adopt and leverage innovations.” Specifically, a country’s level of industrialization can 
be the most important factor determining growth (Tammen et al. 2000).14 Tammen et al. 
(2000, 16) explain that those countries that extract natural resources should be more 
likely to become stronger.15  
Hypothesis 2: Under power transition theory, the rate and scope of the diffusion of 
drones will vary. The states with the greatest national power, or level of industrialization, 
should adopt drones while the least industrialized states are not expected to adopt them.  
 
The main issue with power transition theory is its emphasis on industrialization 
determining whether a state has the capacity to emulate. Why should an industrialized 
state adopt an innovation in the first place? The theory requires revision and more 
exploration in the area of diffusion. Moreover, Alvin and Heidi Toffler (1993) argue that 
national power does not need to be so closely tied to the level of industrialization in the 
new ‘information era’. Goldman and Andres (1996) agree, “the information revolution 
suggests the process of improving resource utilization does not end with industrial 
maturity…the macrosocial foundations of success in the information age are not limited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Note: Power transition theorists state that other factors are important to determining national growth. 
Tammen et al. (2000, 18) write that a state’s total population is the, “sine qua non for great power status.” 
But, they note its effects are important in the long term. Eventually, a larger population will determine the 
level of industrialization. For the purpose of this thesis, which is concerned with the short term diffusion of 
drones, the level of industrialization of states in the recent past is taken into account to determine national 
growth, and thereby, the ability to adopt a military innovation.   
15 However, power transition theory needs to better explain why a state’s level of industrialization translates 
into adopting military innovations.	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to industrialization.” They cite a counterexample to the theory (Goldman and Andres 
1996, 85). Industrialization was not necessarily indicative of a country’s power 
throughout the Cold War. In 1985, the Soviet Union was producing 160 million tons of 
steel per year. At the same time, the United States was producing 74 million tons. Steel 
production should be one of the most important indicators of a country’s industrial 
prowess. Still, the United States, not the Soviet Union, was the country left standing only 
a few years later. Furthermore, power transition theory fails to provide an explicit 
definition for how industrialized a nation needs to be in order to adopt a military 
technology.  
Organization theory provides the last major prediction for the diffusion of drones. 
Under the auspices of the theory, a state’s particular society, culture, government and 
military organization affect the rate of adoption (Goldman and Eliason 2003). Quincy 
Wright (1958) argues for the special importance of culture in determining whether a state 
will adopt an innovation. By culture, he means whether the technology ‘fits’ in with the 
organizations of the state that are adopting the innovation (he remains somewhat vague 
on this point). If a state’s military invests heavily into researching new technologies, for 
example, it is more likely to adopt military innovations. Wright (1988) explains 
(Goldman and Andres 1996), “Technologies are not superficial devices from which all 
cultures can benefit and which may originate anywhere and diffuse easily and rapidly. On 
the contrary, technologies are related to the culture as a whole.” Goldman (2003) also 
makes similar arguments about the importance of culture.  
Organization theory has one major advantage over the other theories: it is the 
most state-centric. A common critique of offense-defense theory is that it expects the 
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international structure to solely dictate adoption. Power transition theory is more state-
centric, but only expects a country’s level of growth, or industrialization, to dictate 
possible adoption. Organization theory resolves these problems and focuses upon many 
domestic factors that can affect adoption (Goldman and Andres 1996, 90). The theory 
does acknowledge how competition might lead to diffusion as in neorealism and offense-
defense (Horowitz 2010 is one example). Goldman and Andres (1996, 96) find in their 
exhaustive review of the theory that the scope and rate of diffusion of innovations should 
be the least uniform and rapid of the theories. In the words of Goldman and Andres 
(1996, 96), “states are just as likely to offset as to emulate the capabilities of the superior 
power.”  Since states have their own unique organizations, there could be a number of 
reasons a state does not adopt the innovation.  
But organization theory is too broad, and Goldman and Andres’s (1996) review of 
the theory and what it predicts concerning diffusion are shaky, at best. Therefore, in order 
to test organization theory, Michael Horowitz’s (2010) adoption-capacity theory will 
represent it. The theory is chosen because of its modernity. Horowitz (2010, 9) explains 
the theory: “once states have the necessary exposure to an innovation, the diffusion of 
military power is mostly governed by two factors: the level of financial intensity required 
to adopt a military innovation, and the amount of organization capital required to adopt 
the innovation.” Similar to offense-defense theory, a demonstration effect takes place- 
indicating what the best military innovations are to adopt. Horowitz (2010, 31) defines 
financial intensity as, “the particular resource mobilization requirements involved in 
attempting to adopt a major military innovation.” Two factors largely determine it: the 
state’s economic power and the financial costs of the innovation. Since drones are much 
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cheaper than aircraft, they would classify as possessing a low financial intensity 
requirement. Organization capital refers to the intangible characteristics of a state’s 
organizations that determine its ability to adopt an innovation. Horowitz (2012, 36) 
proposes three measures to determine it: the organization’s age, the amount of resources 
it devotes to military experimentation and its critical task focus. In short, the adoption of 
an innovation is likely when the organization is young (less steeped by tradition), more 
willing to invest in research (more innovative), and has broad critical tasks (meaning its 
goals are general, allowing the organization to be more open-minded about adopting new 
military innovations). In short, since drones are simply unmanned aircraft, meaning they 
are similar to manned aircraft, it should not be difficult for states’ organizations to adopt 
them- as long as that state already has manned aircraft. 
Hypothesis 3:  The diffusion of drones is determined by financial intensity and 
organizational capital. Drones are cheap so more countries are expected to adopt them. 
Moreover, organization capital matters. Organizations that are young, invest more in 
research and development, and have broader critical tasks should adopt drones more 
quickly.  
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Table 1: The three major IR theories and their predictions of drone diffusion 
International 
Relations theory 
Motivation to 
adopt innovation 
Capacity to adopt 
innovation 
Hypothesis 
concerning 
diffusion 
Offense-Defense  The type of balance 
present, which 
determines if states 
face a security 
threat. The threat 
determines adoption 
[Not necessarily 
addressed] 
Drones will diffuse 
more rapidly in an 
offensive balance 
but more slowly in a 
defensive one. The 
type of innovation 
(offensive or 
defensive) matters. 
Power transition  Level of national 
development, i.e. 
industrialization  
Level of 
industrialization  
The more 
industrialized 
nations are expected 
to adopt drones. 
Organization 
Theory (Adoption-
Capacity Theory) 
Competition is one 
factor. But, it also 
depends if the state 
can adopt the 
innovation 
Financial intensity 
and organizational 
capital  
Since drones require 
low levels of 
financial intensity, 
more states should 
adopt them. 
Moreover, the 
organizational 
capital should not 
matter too much 
since drones are 
similar already to 
manned aircraft.  
Source: Goldman and Andres (1996), among others 
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THE DATA CONCERNING THE PROLIFERATION OF DRONES  
The major sources publically available detailing the proliferation of drones are the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO). Both provide enough data to definitively estimate the 
diffusion of drones since the 1960s. It is important to note that there are two major 
international regimes that attempt to limit the spread of drones and may hinder each 
theory’s ability to predict diffusion: the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
and the Wassenaar Arrangement (Wassenaar). The MTCR was originally created to halt 
the diffusion of ballistic missiles in the Cold War, while the Wassenaar originally aimed 
at halting the diffusion of conventional weapons. Of the two, the MTCR has the most 
leverage inhibiting the diffusion of drones. The MTCR passes legislation on a consensus 
basis. Once proposals are passed, all 34 member states are strongly expected to follow the 
proposals. Notable members of the regime include Canada, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Italy, Japan and the United States. Israel and China are not members. 
The MTCR defines drones into two categories (GAO 2012, 5). Category I drones 
are those that are the largest and most capable. Once a drone can carry a 500 kg (or 1102 
pounds) payload for more than 300 km (or 186 miles), it is classified as a category I 
drone. The drone that killed the Hamas leader al-Jabari was one such drone, albeit it was 
armed. Regime members hoping to export such drones must first apply a strong 
presumption of denial standard, meaning that the transfer should occur only in rare 
instances already defined under the guidelines. Israel, not a member, has become the 
first-mover, or primary exporter of drones. Unlike Category I drones, Category II ones 
are not subject to the presumption of denial in order to export. They are less sophisticated 
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and do not meet the payload and distance criteria of their category I counterparts. They 
are often outfitted for information gathering missions. The United States and Israel are by 
far the major exporters of such drones.  
Overall, the MTCR has enjoyed limited success.16 In fact, the GAO (2012) argues 
that it is failing its mission to halt the diffusion of drones. Figure 1 highlights the scope of 
drone diffusion as of 2011. Approximately 76 countries, shaded in the map, possess 
drones. The list below the map identifies them. However, the United Kingdom’s Ministry 
of Defense (2012) recently reported in Parliament that over 80 countries to their 
knowledge have drones. Of these, around a dozen or so possess drones capable of 
carrying out armed attacks. As for the rate of diffusion, the GAO (2012) details that it has 
been rapid. Although no data on the rate of diffusion is provided before the year 2004, 
since that year 35 new countries have obtained them, increasing from 41 to 76 by 2011. 
Taking the Ministry of Defense assessment at heart, in which 80 countries now possess 
drones, the diffusion has almost doubled since 2004. A more in depth review is startling. 
In 2004, the GAO reported that around 32 nations were developing or manufacturing 250 
models. In 2011, the number increased to at least 50 countries developing more than 900 
different drone systems- 700 more systems than in 2004. The proliferation is happening 
so quickly that the report (2012, 25) admonishes that the United States government, “has 
no comprehensive view of the volume of UAV technology it authorized for export.”  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This news may be hopeful in the sense that perhaps such control regimes are not affecting the theories’ 
ability to predict diffusion. However, future studies on drone proliferation should assess these claims. 
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Figure 1: The number of countries possessing drones in 2011 
Source: GAO analysis of various unclassified sources.  
 
Although the GAO may provide the most comprehensive report detailing the 
scope and rate of drone diffusion, it only provides the bare facts. SIPRI (2012) provides a 
more detailed account tracing the major exporters and recipients or licensees of drones 
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from the year 1960 to 2011.17 Compiling the data from its armed transfers database, it is 
evident that the diffusion of drones has been rapid. Although the data may not be as 
definitive as the GAO (2012) report, it is possible to determine the number of drone deals 
between countries since 1960- the decade in which the first drone exports occurred. 
Drone deals refer to the transaction of ready-made drones or drone parts (with an 
instruction manual for building the drone) between two countries (SIPRI 2012). They are 
important in the sense that they may be responsible for the majority of states acquiring 
drones.18 Figure 2 provides a graph showcasing the number of drone deals. Drone 
proliferation was slow around 1960 and 1970, but then accelerated around the 1990s. 
Source: SIPRI armed transfers database 
Figure 2: The number of drone deals per year 1960-2011 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 According to SIPRI (2012), a recipient state is one who receives the already manufactured drone. A 
licensee is a nation “granted permission to produce major conventional weapons from kits or blueprints” 
provided by the exporter.  
18 Only a few states possess their own drone industries, or the ability to manufacture their own drones 
(GAO 2012).	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The results from Figure 2 clearly demonstrate that drone deals rapidly increased 
starting in the mid 1990s. It seems that 1994 marks the first step in the ‘ladder’ in the 
graph. For the next 17 years, there is a growth trend in which by 2000, the number of 
deals does not fall below four a year. From 2004 to 2011, there were approximately 115 
deals, while from 1960 to 1993, there were only 21 deals. This means that over 84% of 
the deals happened after 1993.19 The problem with the graph is that it does not specify the 
number of countries that received drones.20 Analyzing the SIPRI database from 1960 to 
1993, the year just before that critical 1994 year, there were 13 different states that 
received drones from four principal exporters. Since 1994, there were at least 42 new 
countries that acquired drones.21 What is more, there were 13 exporters.  
The SIPRI database differs from the GAO (2012) report in the number of 
countries that have drones. The GAO contends 76 countries acquired them by 2011, 
while SIPRI counts 60 countries. The discrepancy is probably due to secret transactions 
SIPRI is unaware of, or the fact that nations acquired drones by producing them, not 
importing them. Still, unlike the GAO, it deserves credit for perhaps being the only 
available dataset disclosing the suppliers and recipients or licensees of drones.  
How about the number of drones dealt to different countries? Did these numbers 
increase over time as the number of drone deals increased? Figure 3 details the number of 
drones that have been delivered to countries. It shows that even though the number of 
drone deals has increased, the number of drones dealt have not. The 1960s and early 
1970s, which mark the onset of drone proliferation, seem to have the same amount of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The United States and Israel accounted for 101 of the total deals since 1960, or 74%. 
20 To recall, diffusion is defined as the number of countries that adopt an innovation. 
21 This number is a conservative estimate. The SIPRI database includes three deals in which the recipient 
country is unknown, one deal in which the recipient is NATO, and one deal in which the recipient is 
Hezbollah, not classified as a country. 
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drones transferred as in the 1990s or 2000s. There was one major but unexpected state in 
that time that dealt many drones: Canada. It was involved in every major drone transfer in 
the early years. In 1963, 1965, and twice in 1970, it respectively struck deals of 100 
drones or more with the United Kingdom, West Germany, and France/Italy. The type of 
drone dealt was a CL-89, a small surveillance drone produced by a private company from 
Canada called Canadair (Flight International 1965, 683). Although it is surprising that 
one private company was able to strike all these deals, the reality was that Canada, 
Britain and West Germany equally were involved in the production of the drone. The 
project was a rare collaborative effort through Canadair (Flight International 1965).   
 
Sourc
e: SIPRI armed transfers database 
Figure 3: The number of drones delivered per year, 1960-2011 
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THE EVIDENCE FOR A DEMONSTRATION EFFECT 
Before the methodology of the study is described, it is important to take into 
account that two of the three theories, offense-defense and adoption-capacity, place 
special importance on a demonstration effect. Competition is central to both theories. In 
such a competition, a demonstration effect alerts states as to which military innovations 
they should adopt. It is highly possible that such an effect occurred through the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars. The United States can be credited for bringing drones to the 
forefront. Ehrhard (2010, 3) concurs, “The terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, were just 
around the corner, and it was in the resulting wars- Afghanistan, Iraq- that the unmanned 
systems burst into full view and became matters of wide public discussion. Singer (2009, 
35) and Gertler (2012, 1) also support the claim. There are three statistics that may 
evidence a demonstration effect in the wars: the number of hours drones flown, the 
number of drones manufactured and the amount of money invested in them.22 All these 
measures helped drones possess greater visibility during the wars. Other states are likely 
to have observed their potential.  
First, the Department of Defense (2011, 22) estimates it has increased the use of 
drones in both wars significantly. Figure 4 traces the almost exponential increase in the 
hours drones flew from 1996 to 2011. The first major increase occurs in 2004, when total 
drone flight for that year was 5,000 hours. One year later, the amount doubled to over 
10,000 hours. By 2011, the latest estimates, they flew a total of 600,000 hours. This 
represents a 120-fold change in hours flown in comparison to the year 2004. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 To reiterate, it is assumed that the international community noticed the United States built more drones, 
flew them more, and invested in them more during the wars. If countries did not notice, then the idea of a 
demonstration effect is ill supported, and offense-defense and adoption-capacity theory’s rationales for the 
mechanism causing diffusion of innovations among states are weakened.  
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Source: UAS Integrated Roadmap 2011-2035 (2010) 
Figure 4: DOD drone flight hours per year, 1996-2011 
The second indicator supporting the notion of a demonstration effect is the rate at 
which the United States produced drones throughout the wars. According to Gertler 
(2012), the Department of Defense possessed 167 drones in 2002. Eight years later, they 
possessed over 7,500. This represents a 45-fold change. Consequently, by 2011, drones 
constituted more than 41% of the total aircraft inventory of the Department of Defense 
(2012, 9). This means that 41% of all aircraft in the Air Force, Army and Navy/Marine 
Corps are drones. The percentage of aircraft that was manned in 2005 was 95%. The 
number drops steeply in the following years. 
The last indicator of a demonstration effect is evident in the funding for drones 
throughout both wars. Figure 5 provides a graph of the amount of money invested into 
drones from 1988 to 2012. Gertler (2012, 14) tracks the funding. From 1988 to 2000, the 
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Department of Defense spent 3.9 billion dollars on drones.23 In the decade or so after, 
2001 to 2013, the total funding was around 26 billion dollars. This represents a 6.5-fold 
change. The investments have grown so dramatically that the Department of Defense 
spent the same amount this past year on drones as they did in 1988 to 2000 (Gertler 2012, 
13). To further support the trend in funding, the United States Congressional Budget 
Office (2012) predicts that in the years 2011 through 2020, more than 36 billion dollars 
will be spent on UAS. Without a doubt, the United States is planning to invest greatly in 
drones. Will more states take notice? Perhaps, the theory most able to predict the present 
diffusion will be more apt to predict the future course of their diffusion. Some possible 
ways to test the theories for accuracy are presented. 
Sources: UAS Roadmap 2005-2030 (2004); UAS Roadmap 2009-2034 (2008); UAS Roadmap 2011-2036 (2010) 
Figure 5: DOD funding per year, 1988-2012 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 These numbers refer to the amount of funding in UAS, not just drones. To recall, the UAS include the 
drones and their support systems on the ground that help fly or monitor them. 
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THE METHODOLOGY TO ASSESS THE THEORIES 
In this section, some ways to test each theory are presented. The tests are limited, but 
hope to find preliminary evidence arguing for or against a theory. By and large, bivariate 
logit regressions and correlation tests are the two methods utilized. In the logit 
regressions, drone ownership by the year 2011 is the dependent, binary variable. The 
Government Accountability Office (2012) provides the data detailing which countries 
specifically owned drones by that year. Two states are added to the list since they 
recently acquired drones after the report was released. These two states are Venezuela 
and Iraq (see Michaels 2012 and Beckhusen 2012). The independent variable in each 
regression will differ from theory to theory.  
(a) Offense-defense theory 
Offense-defense theory postulates that states in an offensive balance will seek to 
adopt innovations. These states are ‘defensively disadvantaged’ and are threatened. In 
offensive balances, diffusion of military innovations should take place. Two different 
types of tests are performed to assess these claims. The first is a logit regression, in 
which, theoretically, states that enter into a militarized interstate dispute are expected to 
have a higher probability of adopting a drone by 2011 in comparison to states without 
such a dispute. Being in a dispute does not indicate whether that state is in an offensive 
balance. But, the presence of the dispute tests the underlying rationale for offense-defense 
theory, namely, that states that feel threatened should be more likely to adopt military 
innovations. The Correlates of War Militarized Interstates Disputes dataset is utilized 
(Ghosn et al. 2004).  Jones et al. (1996, 163) define militarized disputes as, “united 
historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of 
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war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official 
representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. Disputes are 
composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat 
short of war.” The mean score for the number of militarized interstate disputes for all 
countries is calculated from 1990 to 2005 and then run against whether the state 
possessed drones. The years 1990 and 2005 are chosen for consistency; they are the years 
used for other independent variables in other bivariate logit tests. 
The second test will try and assess the notion of offensive and defensive alliances. 
This time, it will test whether states that have recently adopted defense weapons have 
also adopted drones. A correlation will be determined between states that adopted 
defensive weapons between the years 1990 and 2005 and those states that adopted drones 
by 2011. The SIPRI armed transfers dataset provides information concerning the transfers 
of air defense systems. It (2012) defines air defense systems as, “(a) all land-based 
surface-to-air missile systems, and (b) all anti-aircraft guns.” Without a doubt, air defense 
systems are defensive in nature. Perhaps, if a meaningful correlation is found between 
states that imported air defense systems and states that imported drones, a minor case can 
be made that these states adopted drones because they felt threatened. Recall that the 
majority of drones proliferated was used for information gathering purposes. Finding a 
correlation could lend support for offense-defense theory in so far as states adopting 
drones did so because they felt threatened. However, it is possible that a correlation also 
be found between states adopting offensive weapons and states adopting drones. 
Unfortunately, this is a difficult test to conduct since there is no weapon provided by the 
SIPRI armed transfers dataset that classifies as offensive in nature.  
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(b) Power transition theory 
The second theory assessed is power transition. It postulates that states with 
higher levels of national development, or levels of industrialization, are more likely to 
adopt an innovation. These claims can be tested by using the Correlates of War 
Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) dataset (Singer et al. 1972). One 
indicator in the dataset can be used to test the theory: iron and steel production (in 
thousands of tons). Some scholars have argued that steel production (but less so for iron), 
is a valid indicator of industrial activity (Singer et al. 1972).24 The mean score of a state’s 
iron and steel production from 1990 to 2005 is calculated. I estimate a logit regression of 
drone possession by 2011 on iron and steel production. The rationale is that states with 
strong levels of national development in the years prior to 2011 should significantly 
increase their chances of possessing a drone by that year.  
(c) Adoption-capacity theory 
Adoption-capacity posits that financial intensity as well as organizational factors 
largely determine whether a state will adopt an innovation (competition is also a causal 
factor according to Horowitz 2010). In order to test financial intensity, a state’s GDP per 
capita (United States dollars in 2011) is averaged from the years 1990 to 2005. The 
World Bank World DataBank (2011) provides the data. Horowitz (2010, 111) uses the 
same measure to test for financial intensity. A logit regression is conducted between a 
state’s mean GDP per capita and whether or not the state possessed drones in 2011. The 
underlying notion is that the wealthier states should have drones. Despite the relative 
cheapness of drones in comparison to manned aircraft, GDP per capita is expected to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 However, Singer et al. (1972)  cautions that, “Steel production is currently declining for some highly 
developed states, and many scholars argue that it is no longer a valid indicator of industrial activity.” 
Another indicator could be used instead in future work. 
  
	  34 
have a positive relationship on drone possession. The reason is that the most common 
drones proliferated, the Category II ones, still on average cost millions of dollars (GAO 
2012; SIPRI 2012). For a developing country, this is not an insignificant investment.  
As for testing organization capital, Horowitz (2012, 37) operationalizes the term by 
describing how an organization’s age, critical task focus, and amount invested into 
research and development all affect a state’s ability to adopt an innovation. For the 
purpose of testing the theory, only one proxy of organization capital- investment into 
research and development- is utilized. The Correlates of War CINC dataset (Singer et al. 
1972) provides a military expenditure indicator (in thousands of US dollars 2011) that 
will be used to test whether investments into research and development affect the chances 
of a state possessing a drone by 2011. Singer et al. (1972) define military expenditure as, 
“the total military budget for a given state for a given year.” According to Horowitz 
2010, 113), included in the military budget are investments into research and 
development of weapons. Horowitz (2010, 113) uses the CINC estimator throughout his 
book. A logit regression of military expenditure on whether a state possessed a drone is 
run. Like before, the mean score for each state’s military expenditure is taken from 1990 
to 2005. If there is a positive link between a state’s military expenditures and whether it 
possessed a drone by 2011, perhaps adoption-capacity theory is supported.  
RESULTS 
In short, the logit regressions and correlations performed found preliminary 
evidence for each theory. The results of the tests are analyzed.  
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 (a) Offense-defense theory 
The first test for offense-defense theory supports the notion that threatened states 
should be more likely to adopt military innovations. It validates the underlying rationale 
for offense-defense theory. The logit regression found that the mean militarized interstate 
dispute score of a state from 1990 to 2005 did have a sizable influence on whether a state 
possessed a drone by 2011. The results were statistically significant at the .05 level, and 
positive. The second test also supported the theory. It sought to find a correlation between 
states adopting defensive technologies and states adopting a drone. If states are adopting 
defensive technology, perhaps they feel threatened. Threatened states should adopt more 
military innovations. A drone, which might be defensive in nature because it often serves 
to gathers information, could be a possible candidate to adopt. A correlation of 70% is 
found between such states.  
(b) Power transition theory 
It seems that initial support is found for power transition theory. Its hypothesis, 
that levels of national development affect whether a state adopts an innovation, is 
validated.. At minimum, the logit regression finds evidence that a state’s average amount 
of industrialization between 1990 and 2005 is a strong predictor of the state possessing a 
drone by 2011. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the .05 level.  
(c) Adoption-capacity theory 
The first test found that a state’s average GDP per capita from 1990 to 2005 did 
not seem to be a significant predictor for whether a state had a drone by 2011. The 
relationship was statistically insignificant. This could be due to the fact that drones are 
relatively cheap in comparison to manned aircraft, and so states might have less barriers 
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to adopting drones, whether they are wealthy states or not. This is in line with the 
hypothesis of the theory (that since drones are cheap, more states should acquire them). 
Perhaps, GDP per capita is not the best indicator, and is somewhat an unnecessary 
predictor. However, it must be noted that the range for the independent variable, GDP per 
capita, was great. It ranged from 135.1335 to 88,926.16 (United States dollars in 2011). 
Thus, to perhaps minimize the outliers, a log of GDP per capita was taken. When the log 
was used in a logit regression, a significant relationship was found between the variable 
and whether states possessed drones by 2011. It seems, then, that even though drones are 
relatively less expensive than manned aircraft, they still cost millions of dollars and are 
not necessarily ‘easy’ for developing states to acquire. The second test for organizational 
capital obtains results that were supportive for the theory. A relationship was found 
between a state’s mean military expenditures from 1990 to 2005 and drone ownership in 
2011. The results were statistically significant at the .05 level, and the direction was 
positive. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the results find preliminary evidence for offense-defense, power 
transition, and adoption-capacity theory. For offense-defense, a state’s mean score for 
militarized interstate disputes from 1990 to 2005 is a significant predictor for determining 
if states possess drones by 2011. The second test found that there was a correlation 
between states that adopted air defense systems, from 1990 to 2005, and those that 
adopted drones by 2011. Perhaps, states initially adopted defensive technologies because 
they were threatened. If that was the case, then those states should be more likely to adopt 
drones. As for power transition theory, a significant and positive relationship was found 
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between a state’s mean iron and steel production from 1990 to 2005 and drone ownership 
by 2011. Lastly, some evidence was found for adoption-capacity theory. To test whether 
financial intensity is a predictor for drone ownership, a logit regression was run between 
a state’s logged mean GDP per capita, from 1990 to 2005, and drone ownership. The 
results confirmed that financial intensity seemed to play a role. The results were 
significant and the coefficient was positive. As for testing whether organizational capital 
plays a role determine whether a state had a drone by 2011, a state’s average military 
expenditure from 1990 to 2005 was tested on drone ownership in a logit regression. In it, 
the variable’s effects are statistically significant and positive.  
Without a doubt, the diffusion of drones seems to be a complicated process with 
varied incentives and constraints that seem to affect the acquisition of drones. All three 
theories received some level of empirical support in these preliminary tests. But, future 
work should address the limited methodology that obtains these conclusions. Perhaps, 
fully specified models will overturn the preliminary findings and ultimately determine 
which theory is the most accurate. 25 Future tests might also be able to sort out which of 
the incentives and constraints matter the most to the process of diffusion. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that perhaps, all factors matter to the same degree.  
Overall, the thesis was concerned with two questions: have drones diffused, and 
what are some possible international relations theories that explain the diffusion of such 
military innovations? The second question, it seems, needs more answering. But, the first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For instance, when testing adoption-capacity theory, the bivariate regression for military expenditure on 
drone ownership was statistically significant. However, when other CINC scores were included into the 
regression, military expenditure suddenly lost statistical significance. The sign also changed from positive 
to negative, but this does not matter so much since the relationship is no longer significant, holding all else 
constant.  	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does not. From 1960 to 2000, the proliferation of drones was nonexistent or slow. But 
sometime around the 2000s, the proliferation was wide and rapid. Specifically, 40 
countries acquired drones from 2005 to 2012. This might be the result of a demonstration 
effect occurring through the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Drone production, flight hours, 
and investments all (nearly) exponentially increased. In both wars, drones demonstrated 
their major advantages. They can save the lives of the pilots they replace, are not prone to 
human emotion and weariness, and are much less expensive than manned aircraft. All the 
while, advances in technology and the nature of asymmetrical wars are making them even 
more useful. States are recognizing the value of drones.  
But, there may be an issue: the majority of drones diffused thus far are only 
capable of surveillance, reconnaissance and other information gathering duties. It seems 
that states are employing them for defensive purposes. As the technology advances, what 
will happen if states obtain drones that are offensive in nature, capable of carrying out 
strikes much like in the al-Jabari case? This question might gain increasing importance as 
the diffusion of drones continues. Perhaps, the diffusion will have great implications on 
the balance of power in the international arena.  
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